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ESSAY
NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Jens David Ohlint
Game theory has been a mainstay in the international relations literature for
several decades, but its appearance in the international law literature is of a
far more recent vintage. Recent accounts have harnessed game theory's al-
leged lessons in service of a new brand of "realism" about international law.
These skeptical accounts conclude that international law loses its normative
force because states that 'follow" international law merely are participants in
a Prisoner's Dilemma seeking to achieve self-interested outcomes. Such
claims are not just vastly exaggerated; they represent a profound misunder-
standing about the significance of game theory. Properly conceived, the best
way to understand international law is as a Nash Equilibrium-a focal
point that states gravitate toward as they make rational decisions regarding
strategy in light of strategies selected by other states.
In domains where international law has the greatest purchase, the pre-
ferred strategy is reciprocal compliance with international norms. This strat-
egy is consistent with the normativity of law and morality, both of which are
characterized by self-interested actors who accept reciprocal constraints on ac-
tion to generate Nash Equilibria and, ultimately, a stable social contract.
These agents- "constrained maximizers," as the philosopher David Gauthier
calls them-accept the constraints of a normative system in order to achieve
cooperative benefits. This Essay concludes by explaining that it is also ra-
tional for states to comply with these constraints: agents evaluate competing
plans and strategies, select the best course of action, and then stick to their
decision, rather than obsessively reevaluating their chosen strategy at each
moment in time. A state that defects from international law when the oppor-
tunity arises may, in the long run, reduce its overall payoff as compared to a
state that selects and adheres to a strategy of constrained maximization.
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INTRODUCTION
For at least several decades, game theory has played a central role
in the international relations literature. Only recently has it emerged
as a powerful force in the international law literature as well. Political
scientists learned as long ago as the 1960s-with the work of Thomas
Schelling-that game theory offered a sophisticated matrix for model-
ing state relations.' The econometrics of game theory came with the
promise of predicting behavior: social scientists could not only ex-
plain why some states had acted the way they did, but might also pre-
dict future behavior under certain conditions.2 The Prisoner's
Dilemma provided an answer for problems regarding coordination
and cooperation that had concerned the international relations litera-
ture for years.3
The central puzzle of the Prisoner's Dilemma literature was the
uncertain and uneasy relationship between a state's selfish behavior in
international relations and a state's commitment to international legal
norms when those norms proved inconvenient or downright inconsis-
tent with a state's self-interest. One school of thought concluded that
states generally act in their self-interest and seek to ignore the pre-
scriptive power of international legal norms when the norms are suffi-
ciently inconvenient.4 A second school of thought concluded that
states are generally more receptive to international norms for a variety
of reasons. For many scholars, receptivity to international legal norms
I See THOMAs C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICr 3-20 (2d ed. 1980) (discuss-
ing the "retarded science of international strategy").
2 Cf JOEL P. TRAcfrrMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL I.AW 4-5
(2008) (discussing how the social science methodologies of modeling and empirical test-
ing can generate and validate predictions and hypotheses).
3 See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 7 (noting that "[w]hat is impressive is. .. how vague
the concepts still are[ ] and how inelegant the current theory of deterrence is"); id. at
213-14 (explaining the Prisoner's Dilemma); id. at 225-26 (using the Prisoner's Dilemma
to explain coordination and cooperation regarding warning systems).
4 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for
International Lauyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 337-38 (1989); John K. Setear, An Iterative
Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37
HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996).
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could be explained by future costs associated with noncompliance
(i.e., loss of reputation that might frustrate a state's ability to negotiate
future agreements), thus collapsing international law compliance into
low-discount rate, self-interested behavior.5  Or, in the alternative,
some scholars concluded that compliance with international legal
norms was internalized as a value that formed one part of a nation's
self-interest. 6 In other words, fidelity to national values included, in-
ter alia, compliance with international law, because some countries
view participation in the global legal order (or fidelity to its underly-
ing norms) as an essential part of their identity and constitutive com-
mitments.7  Therefore, compliance with international law was a
national interest to be included with other more egoistic national val-
ues. This novel move was simultaneously edifying and deedifying in
the sense that it elevated fidelity to international law to a high na-
tional interest (a good thing), yet simultaneously deflated interna-
tional law compliance by turning it into just another interest in a field
of interests, as opposed to a universal norm that demands compliance
in the face of contrary self-interest. What each school rejected was
what one might call a naive account of international law: that states
comply with international law simply because it is law.
While game theory offered theorists of international relations a
model for explaining state relations, the methodology has had a far
more explosive effect among international lawyers. Recent accounts
have harnessed alleged lessons learned from game theory in service of
a new brand of realism about international law.8 These skeptical ac-
5 See, e.g., John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International
Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State
Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REv. 1, 8, 74-75 (1997).
6 See, e.g., Peter J. Katzenstein, Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,
in THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL SECURITY- NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS 13, 17-26
(PeterJ. Katzenstein ed., 1996) (discussing the effects of cultural-institutional context and
political identity in state action); see also ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS 198 (1999) (defining national interest to include physical survival, auton-
omy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem).
7 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
42-45 (1995) (suggesting that states may act a certain way because of their beliefs about
what membership in the community of nations entails); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 25 (1990) (arguing that nations obey rules because they per-
ceive the rules to have a high degree of legitimacy); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE:
LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 46-48 (2d ed. 1979) (rejecting the cynical view that state compli-
ance only occurs in cases of rational expected outcomes); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do
Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2602-03 (1997) (noting that "interna-
tional law norms now help construct national identities and interests" and analyzing the
process of "interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international [legal]
norms").
8 See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw
(2005); Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 STAN.
L. REv. 1901 (2003). The current wave is "new" because it harkens back to a first wave of
prominent skeptics of international law. See generally HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS
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counts conclude that international law loses its normative force be-
cause states that "follow" international law are simply participants in a
Prisoner's Dilemma seeking to achieve self-interested outcomes.9 In
short, these arguments can be distilled to the following elements. Ef-
fective multilateral agreements are rarely achieved, either in treaty or
customary form.10 Most states consent to international legal norms
through a process of bilateral agreements with specific partners who
in turn have their own set of overlapping bilateral agreements."
Compliance with these agreements, whether via treaty or customary
law, is usually based on considerations specific to a particular partner
rather than general considerations regarding the content of the legal
norm.12 In other words, states comply with international norms in
specific interactions with a particular state when there are good rea-
sons to believe that the other state will reciprocate such compliance.' 3
This explains why a state might adhere to a particular legal norm with
one partner but not with another. According to this school of
thought, the vast majority of the content of international law fits this
paradigm as opposed to one that posits general legal obligations to
the entire world community. 14 Reducing international law to a series
of overlapping bilateral arrangements facilitates the use of the Pris-
oner's Dilemma as a convincing model, though of course it is not nec-
essary to limit the analysis to bilateral interactions. It is, after all,
possible to have a multiple-player Prisoner's Dilemma, though cooper-
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (2d ed. 1954) (updating a first
edition that discussed the obsolescence of the sovereign nation state and warned against
the illusory hopes for the newly established United Nations).
9 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 184 (concluding that "[w] hen states cooper-
ate in their self-interest, they naturally use the moralistic language of obligation rather
than the strategic language of interest. But saying that the former is evidence of moral
motivation is like saying that when states talk of friendship or brotherhood they use these
terms, which are meant to reflect aspirations for closer relations, in a literal sense"). Gold-
smith and Posner thereby presume that the language of morality and the language of inter-
est are mutually exclusive categories-a proposition they never explicitly defend. See also
id. at 100 (distinguishing the view that states comply with international law because it is the
right thing to do from the view that states comply when it is in their self-interest).
10 Id. at 36-37 (arguing that, in treaty contexts, states may achieve "shallow multistate
cooperation" and that, in the context of customary international law, "genuine multistate
cooperation is unlikely to emerge"); see also id. at 87 (asserting skepticism that "genuine
multinational collective action problems can be solved by treaty").
11 Id. at 87 (describing how cooperation in pairs creates a multilateral regime).
12 Id. at 88 (describing the "strong pattern in international law" whereby threats of
retaliation are nearly always the responsibility of the victims of violations and concluding
that the "enforcement of multilateral treaty regimes is usually bilateral").
13 See id. at 87-88.
14 Id. at 66 (arguing that theorists inflate context-specific and temporally-limited be-
havioral patterns, coincidences of interest, and situations of coercion into exogenous rules
of customary law).
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ation becomes more challenging as the number of players increases.' 5
In any event, the rhetorical advantage to the bilateral claim is clear: it
makes the Prisoner's Dilemma that much more intuitive as a model
for international law.
The new realists proceed to argue that compliance in a Prisoner's
Dilemma is based on reciprocity that is hard to come by. A state will
prefer to violate the treaty or customary rule while their competitor
adheres to it, though this state of affairs is hard to achieve as all com-
petitors share the exact same preference.16 Thus, in order to avoid
the opposite result (mutual defection), states cooperate in the form of
international agreements to produce the next-best preference: mutual
adherence to the norm. Now comes the theoretical payoff, in the
form of multiple claims: First, cooperation in the form of interna-
tional agreements only shows up in the very limited situations when
participants in the game have equal or near-equal bargaining power.' 7
In contrast, most cases of international relations involve unequal bar-
gaining relationships, where a weak state is forced to adhere to the
wishes of the stronger state or face unfavorable consequences. 8 This
reduces the scope of international law. Second, even in cases of com-
parable bargaining power, the application of the norm is based en-
tirely on reciprocal compliance.19 States generally only follow the
norm if their bilateral competitor also follows the norm. Unfortu-
nately, international law has a relative paucity of enforcement mecha-
nisms compared with domestic law, making assured reciprocal
compliance through coercion rare and difficult to achieve. This fur-
ther reduces the scope of international law. Third, even when both
states in a Prisoner's Dilemma follow the norm, they are doing so out
of state self-interest. 20 In other words, it is within a state's self-interest
to follow an international legal norm if and only if the other player is
also following that same norm. Consequently, international law is re-
ally just a matter of self-interested behavior on the part of states, not a
robust system of law that demands compliance even when it conflicts
with a participant's self-interest.
Now comes the normative payoff of the argument, in the form of
a fourth claim. Because international law is reducible to self-inter-
15 Id. at 36 (discussing the costs associated with the multilateral model, including in-
creased costs of monitoring and the risk of undetected free-riding).
16 Id. at 32-35 (describing coordination problems).
17 Id. at 60 (recalling that the three-mile territorial sea rule was insisted upon by states
with powerful navies but that even these powerful states were often unable to make credi-
ble threats to enforce the rule).
18 For a full resolution of this point, see infra Part III.B.
19 See, e.g., GOLDSMrTH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 150-51 (discussing reciprocal com-
pliance in the context of GATT).
20 See id. at 100.
873
HeinOnline  -- 96 Cornell L. Rev. 873 2010-2011
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ested behavior, states have no independent obligation to follow inter-
national law when it conflicts with their self-interest.21 International
law is based entirely on the Prisoner's Dilemma structure of self-inter-
ested behavior, thus it has no independent normative force. If states
wish to comply with international law, they may do so when it suits
them. They may also structure international law obligations to their
own benefit, but ought not to be concerned with how these norms
affect humanity as a whole or the global community. 22 Indeed, the
claim is not just that states are not required to follow international law
when it conflicts with their self-interest, but in fact that they should
not. A government that follows international law when such law con-
flicts with the self-interest of the state is breaching its fiduciary duty to
its citizens and placing the welfare of foreigners above the welfare of
its citizens.23 Partiality is not just permitted, but required.24 This Es-
say takes aim at the validity of the third claim and its normative payoff.
Since the third claim is based on a conceptual error, the supposed
normative payoff is illusory.
Predictably, the new realism about international law sparked a se-
rious counterattack from both the professoriate and the international
bar,25 though such realism already had its adherents in some corners
of the U.S. Department of State (in previous administrations).26 Most
law school professors writing about international law are deeply in-
vested in the claim that international law has normative force and that
states ought to follow it.27 Consequently, scholars have mounted nu-
merous defenses of international law, cataloguing the effectiveness of
human rights treaties and identifying the complex compliance and
enforcement mechanisms that currently exist under international
law.28 Although most of these arguments are undoubtedly correct,
they miss something fundamental and foundational about the new re-
21 Id. at 185 (arguing that a moral obligation to comply with international law is
illusory).
22 Id. at 205-06.
23 Id. at 209-15.
24 See also Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1667, 1675-82 (2003) (discussing the limitations on ascribing strong cosmopolitan senti-
ments and duties to liberal democratic governments).
25 For a particularly trenchant example, see Robert Hockett, The Limits of Their World,
90 MINN. L. REv. 1720 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8).
26 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power: Inter-
national Law in an Age of Power Disequilibrium, 100 Am. J. INT'L L. 88, 90 (2006) ("Not sur-
prisingly, however, the claim [of law's fecklessness] resonates strongly in the halls of
American governance.").
27 For a classic example, see MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INSIGHTS FROM THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT (2008).
28 See, e.g., ANDREW T. GuzMAN, How INTERNATIONAL LAW WoRs: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 13 (2008) (providing an explanation of international law's effectiveness from a
rational choice perspective).
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alism: the use of game theory as a mechanism for making claims re-
garding international law's normativity-a claim that was largely absent
from the international relations literature on game theory.29 The use
of game theory as an underlying methodology for understanding in-
ternational law presents unique issues regarding the degree to which a
descriptive methodology can yield normative conclusions regarding
international law.
I argue here that the new realism about international law suffers
from a profound misunderstanding about the significance of game
theory. In short, the new realism misuses the methodology by con-
cluding that self-interested behavior and normativity are mutually ex-
clusive.30 Indeed, that is the conclusion that the new realists draw
from the Prisoner's Dilemma. This conclusion is false.
In order to defend this claim, we must engage in some prelimina-
ries. First, Part I of this Essay offers a more nuanced understanding of
the Prisoner's Dilemma in international law and explains how the in-
ternational legal order promotes the creation of Nash Equilibria
among its participants. Part II then explains the compatibility be-
tween rational self-interest and the normativity of international law,
invoking the concept of constrained maximization. By invoking the
rationality of plans, Part II also explains why it would be rational for a
29 Although Guzman uses game theory models expertly to demonstrate the effective-
ness of international law, id., he does not directly dwell on the issue that I have raised here,
i.e., whether the assumption of self-interest implicit in the Prisoner's Dilemma undermines
international law's essential normativity. Guzman has pursued his analysis in a number of
important essays. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International
Law, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1823 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory]
(presenting a theory of international law in which compliance occurs in a model of ra-
tional, self-interested states); Andrew T. Guzman, Reputation and International Law, 34 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 379 (2006) [hereinafter Guzman, Reputation and International Law]
(describing expected loss of reputation as one mechanism of ensuring compliance); An-
drew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115 (2005) [here-
inafter Guzman, Saving Customary International Law] (mapping out a theory of customary
international law based on a model of rational choice); see alsoJeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P.
Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1999) (exploring
the actual and potential application of law and economics to international law).
30 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 100. Other commentators have
noted the lack of support for this assumption. See, e.g., George Norman & Joel P.
Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 541, 541-42 (2005).
The argument presented by Goldsmith and Posner relies on the proposition that custom-
ary international law is based on opinio juris and that acting in self-interest precludes acting
out of a sense of legal obligation. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 14-15. The
answer to this skeptical challenge lies in properly understanding opinio juris as "the intent
of states to propose or accept a rule of law that will serve as the focal point of behavior,
implicate an important set of default rules applicable to law but not to other types of social
order, and bring into play an important set of linkages among legal rules." Norman &
Trachtman, supra, at 542; see alsoJos6 E. Alvarez, A BIT on Custom, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 17, 43 (2009) ("That states have or may have had 'economic' reasons to conclude a
treaty does not exclude other normative effects produced by these treaties' entry into
force, subsequent practice under them, or efforts to enforce them.").
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state to follow international law even when it might defect with impu-
nity. Finally, Part III considers several objections, including the natu-
ralistic fallacy, the unequal bargaining power of states, and the alleged
inability of nation-states to bear moral obligations.
I
THE PRISONER's DILEMMA AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM
The outline of the Prisoner's Dilemma story as told by the new
realists is essentially correct, though at times it borders on unsophisti-
cated and draws the wrong conclusions from the methodology. We
shall start with the unsophisticated nature of the model and then pro-
ceed to the second question of the false conclusions drawn from it. As
to the model, Goldsmith and Posner view international cooperation as
a bilateral repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.3' While this view is true, the
model can be revised and tweaked. Properly conceived, the best way
to understand international law is as a Nash Equilibrium-a focal
point that states gravitate toward as they make rational decisions re-
garding strategy in light of strategies selected by other states.32 In
game theory, a Nash Equilibrium is defined as a solution in which
each player evaluates the strategies of their competitors and decides
that they gain no advantage by unilaterally changing strategy when all
other players keep their own strategies unchanged.33 A Nash Equilib-
rium functions as a kind of focal point, where participants in the game
gravitate toward a particular legal norm and choose "compliance" as
their strategy if and only if the other players in the game are also
choosing compliance as their strategy.34 When a bilateral interna-
tional agreement works, one state realizes that unilaterally choosing
"breach" as its strategy would confer no benefit because the costs asso-
ciated with that shift in strategy are too high. So, the player sticks with
compliance. If one player decides that a shift in strategy (i.e., breach)
31 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 87-88.
32 Cf Eyal Benvenisti, Customary International Law as a judicial Tool for Promoting Effi-
ciency, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THEORETI-
cA PERSPECTIVEs 85, 92-94 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004) (describing the
use of customary international law for shifting to a new, more efficient equilibrium);
Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 293, 297-98 (Beth A. Simmons & Richard H. Steinberg eds.,
2006) (discussing how tacit understandings and implicit rules may create a Nash
equilibrium).
33 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND
THE LAw 39-41 (1994).
34 See KAUSHIK BASU, PRELUDE TO POLITICAL EcONOMY. A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL AND
POLncAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMICS 114-16 (2000) (describing the problem of choos-
ing between multiple Nash Equilibria); see also BAIRD ET AL., supra note 33, at 39-40 (dis-
cussing a classical example of a focal point); SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 110-12 (discussing
focal points).
876 [Vol. 96:869
HeinOnline  -- 96 Cornell L. Rev. 876 2010-2011
2011] NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
is indeed in his or her best interest, then the players fall out of Nash
Equilibrium.35
A. Bilateral Agreements
In domains where international law has the greatest purchase,
the strategy that results in the equilibrium is reciprocal compliance
with international norms.36 Consider a bilateral treaty negotiation re-
garding extraditions between two countries: State A and State B sign a
treaty promising mutual extradition between the countries and estab-
lishing a legal framework governing these extraditions. Suppose that
State A has custody of a suspect and must decide whether to comply
with its obligations under the treaty regime. State A realizes that fail-
ure to comply with the regime will not only risk retaliation from State
B in future extradition matters, but will also have numerous collateral
effects-including possible retaliation in other bilateral contexts with
State B as well as a loss of reputation in treaty negotiations with other
states, who may now be less willing to sign agreements with State A. 3 7
Consequently, State A decides that compliance with the legal norm is
in its self-interest and that it has no reason to unilaterally change its
strategy. The cost of shifting strategies is just too high. Consequently,
the states in this bilateral treaty regime are in Nash Equilibrium with
each other because neither party has reason to unilaterally change its
strategy. In this case, their compliance with an international treaty
norm can be understood through game theory's lens of self-interested
behavior.3 8
Of course, one might point out that it may be beneficial for a
state to defy the treaty commitment when it proves inconvenient, thus
effectively transforming the state into a free rider that receives the
benefits of the legal regulation but ignores the costs when they prove
inconvenient.39 This is certainly true, but the whole point of the struc-
ture of international law is that this outcome (free ridership) is more
difficult to achieve ceteris paribus. Because states are linked together
through mutual ongoing interactions that are explicitly legal in na-
35 Cf Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law
of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 215 (1990) (discussing game theory in the context of
contract breach).
36 See Norman & Trachtman, supra note 30, at 542, 571.
37 See, e.g., Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory, supra note 29 (presenting a theory of
international law in which compliance occurs in a model of rational, self-interested states);
Setear, supra note 5, at I (examining the international legal rules that govern responses to
treaty breaches from the perspective of rationalist theories of international relations).
38 However, pace Goldsmith and Posner, the parties' self-interested compliance does
not preclude their acting out of opiniojuris. See Norman & Trachtman, supra note 30, at
541-42; see also Alvarez, supra note 30, at 44.
39 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 87 (arguing that the free-rider problem is
worse when an agreement involves large numbers of states).
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ture, a state cannot benefit by changing its strategy away from compli-
ance. If it does so, it incurs costs associated with noncompliance that
overwhelm any putative benefits from its defection against the norm.
The whole point of international law is to create a structure whereby
the cost of shifting strategy away from compliance becomes higher
than it would be without legal regulation in that particular area. As a
result, each state in the Nash Equilibrium decides to comply with the
legal norm in question.
It is important to remember that the equilibrium need not be the
most optimal or efficient legal regulation possible.40 It might be the
case that a different legal regime creates cooperation that produces
greater benefits for every state.41 But this kind of Pareto optimality
may be difficult to achieve. For example, it might be more efficient
for the states to set up a bilateral international court to decide all
cases of extradition between the two countries, though each state grav-
itates towards a Nash Equilibrium that is far below the Pareto optimal
outcome for these two players. There is nothing in international law
that promises that a stable set of legal regulations between competi-
tors will be the most efficient regulations possible. 42 Indeed, over
time one hopes that the legal regime might evolve closer to Pareto
optimality as initial cooperation yields greater cooperation. But in
some cases, the particular toolbox of compliance mechanisms in inter-
national law might limit the amount of optimality one can achieve in
this context.43 Although international law yields stable Nash Equilib-
ria, it will never yield the kind of Pareto optimality that one finds in a
domestic legal system.
B. Multilateral Agreements
The same analysis would apply in a multilateral context. Con-
sider, for example, the most important area of international legal reg-
ulation: the use of force.44 This is also the most contentious area of
international legal regulation, one that the new realists often use as a
poster child for their contention that legal norms will give way to self-
interest when the cost of compliance becomes inconvenient.45 How-
40 See BAsu, supra note 34, at 114 (discussing problem of multiple Nash Equilibria).
41 See HERBERT GINTis, GAME THEORY EVOLVING: A PROBLEM-CENTERED INTRODUCTION
TO MODELING STRATEGIC INTERACTION 109 (2d ed. 2009).
42 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Public Choice and International Regulatory Competition, 90
GEO. L.J. 971, 975 (2002) (discussing how choice of law and issues of public choice affect
the substantive law adopted by states).
43 See id. at 984 (noting that there are "problems with international cooperation that
make it inferior to well-functioning domestic systems").
44 See MICHAELJ. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAw, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM
AFTER Kosovo 3 (2001) ("It is widely agreed that the most important rules are rules gov-
erning use of force .
45 See id.
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ever, the Nash Equilibrium here is clear. The norm in question is the
legal prohibition on the use of force, in both the UN Charter and
customary law, unless such use of force is authorized by the Security
Council-the central clearing house for decisions regarding interna-
tional peace and security.46 Some scholars trace the norm back to the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, before which aggressive war was simply recog-
nized as inevitable (and therefore not presumptively illegal) .47 This is
too simplistic, since it was at the very least implicit in the notion of
Westphalian sovereignty that states were free not just from outside in-
terference in the widest sense, but also from outside attack in the nar-
rowest sense.48 In the current scheme, the prohibition against the use
of force is now coupled with the Security Council's authority to au-
thorize use of force to restore international peace and security. 49
Unfortunately, Security Council authorizations for the use of
force are rare, and, since the threat of a veto is always present, states
cannot predict with any reasonable certainly when the Security Coun-
cil will authorize such use of force.5 0 Thus, State A complies with the
norm and eschews the use of force. This strategy of compliance is
made with the hope that the other players in the game will also favor
compliance. However, no state can assume that competitors will
adopt the same strategy; the competitors might choose violation as
their strategy and in so doing reserve the right to use force at their
discretion. Why would the second state choose this strategy? Perhaps
because the costs associated with noncompliance are relatively mild.
Although they might be sued before the International Court ofJustice
(ICJ) and lose international standing (e.g., reputation), these costs
pale in comparison to foregoing the use of force when your competi-
tors refuse to do the same. This is why the international legal commu-
nity has not navigated toward a Nash Equilibrium that grants the
Security Council the exclusive authority to authorize military force.
The stakes are too high and the legal prohibitions insufficient to in-
centivize reciprocal compliance. Simply put, each participant has an
incentive to change its strategy away from compliance regardless of
the strategy chosen by its competitors.
46 See generally id. at 17-19 (describing the UN Charter and the Security Council's role
in authorizing the use of force).
47 See YoRAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 83 (4th ed. 2005)
(describing the pact as a "watershed" moment in the development of jus ad bellum).
48 See MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 114-17 (2005).
49 GLENNON, supra note 44, at 17-19.
50 Cf Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authoriza-
tions to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 124, 154 (1999)
(discussing Council's impotence and failure to act in this area).
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It is precisely for this reason that, at its earliest incarnation, inter-
national law gravitated toward a norm regarding the use of force that
allowed unilateral exceptions to the prohibition against the use of
force in cases of self-defense. Nineteenth-century treatises regarding
public international law, in discussing the use of force, made clear
that military force was legal in cases of self-defense or self-preserva-
tion.51 This exception to the norm prohibiting the use of force is as
old as the prohibition itself. Although states were unwilling to adopt a
strategy of compliance with a blanket prohibition on military force,
states have been willing to adopt a strategy of compliance with a more
nuanced legal norm that always allows military force in self-defense.52
A state can comply with this norm because even if a competitor in the
game changes strategy, defects from the norm, and engages in aggres-
sive warfare, the first state can still use force in self-defense to protect
itself, consistent with the legal norm. In other words, the cost of com-
pliance with the norm does not require that a state risk its national
security.53
Consequently, states have a reason to stick with the strategy of
compliance even given the uncertainty regarding the strategy of their
competitors in the game. That is why a Nash Equilibrium has devel-
oped around a prohibition regarding the use of force unless author-
ized by the Security Council or in self-defense. Each state benefits
from the legal norm-a stable world order without aggressive force
and constant warfare-and therefore complies with the legal norm
because compliance with the norm is also consistent with purely de-
fensive force when competitors in the game change their strategy.54
So, no state has reason to unilaterally change its strategy in the game.
C. Law and Self-Interest
It is clearly correct, then, that international fidelity to the legal
prohibition regarding the use of force can be described, using game
51 See, e.g., JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 115
(1894); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 90 (8th ed. 1866); THEODORE
D. WooLsEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 184 (5th ed.1879).
52 See O'CONNELL, supra note 48, at 240 (discussing the fact that the United Nations
Charter prohibits force generally while leaving a limited exception for self-defense).
5s But see Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REv. 699,
702 (2005) (noting some uncertainty about "whether preemptive self-defense is permissi-
ble under international law, or whether it is permissible but only under certain
conditions").
54 It is certainly true that not all states comply with the prohibition regarding the use
of force. However, Henkin must surely be right that "almost all nations observe almost all
principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time."
See HENKIN, supra note 7, at 47 (emphasis omitted). If there is any doubt regarding the
veracity of the maxim, one need only ask what the world would look like today if the
prohibition regarding the use of force was not followed most of the time.
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theory, as self-interested behavior on the part of states. However, this
much was already clear in the previous wave of international relations
scholarship twenty-five years ago.55 Although advancements in the
game theory models have only added sophistication to the analysis,
they are hardly new. However, the new realists operating in the inter-
national law scholarship take all of this as evidence for a much more
explosive normative claim: since compliance with international law is
based on self-interest, international law has no normative pull.5 6 The
status of international law as law is seriously called into doubt.
There are many different ways of making this claim. One might
conclude that international law is not law at all, or one might simply
claim that international law is far less important than international
lawyers think.57 Or, one might say that states only comply with inter-
national law when doing so furthers their self-interest and reject it
whenever it does not, making international law different not in degree
but in kind from domestic law.58 All of these claims add up to an
assault on international law's normativity.
Of course, I am not the first to object to the new realism and
there is now a wide array of literature providing renewed justifications
for international law in the face of the new realist attack.5 9 However,
none of the defenses have, to my mind, adequately emphasized the
specific methodological mistakes made by the new realists. Although
game theory allows us to model international law as a game of self-
interest, this picture is entirely consistent, pace Goldsmith and Posner,
with international law's normativity. Simply put, the Prisoner's Di-
lemma also provides a model to explain morality itself (i.e., that of
self-interested actors who accept reciprocal moral constraints on ac-
tion as a social contract), and this dual nature of the Prisoner's Di-
lemma cannot be taken as a reason to deny morality's normativity, on
pain of a reductio ad absurdum to complete moral skepticism.
II
SELF-INTEREST AND NORMATIYrY
In this Part, I unpack the observation that game theory provides a
model not only to depict international law as a game of self-interest
but also to explain morality itself. In 1986, the moral philosopher
David Gauthier published Morals By Agreement, a novel interpretation
55 Cf SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 119 (suggesting that game theory can be more ex-
tensively used to analyze nonzero-sum games of strategy).
56 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 184 (arguing that states use moralis-
tic and legalistic rhetoric merely to disguise purely self-interested motives).
57 Id. at 225 ("International law is a real phenomenon, but international law scholars
exaggerate its power and significance.").
58 See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 44; Lobel & Ratner, supra note 50.
59 See, e.g., Hockett, supra note 25; Norman & Trachtman, supra note 30, at 541-42.
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of social contract theory that harnessed the power of game theory to
explain why rational actors would agree to a system that constrained
their behavior.60 Morals By Agreement provided, for the first time, a
fully realized model of rational self-interested individuals agreeing to
a social contract of morality.61 The relationship between reason and
morality has a long pedigree, going back as far as Plato's The Republic
and, more explicitly, Kant's work on the categorical imperative and
the wave of contractarian theories following Rawls. 6 2  But for
Gauthier, only game theory provided the necessary tools to explain
how individual rationality and moral constraints might be consistent
with each other.63 Indeed, for Gauthier, the claim was even stronger:
the latter could be derived from the former in the sense that one
could demonstrate that rational agents ought to accept moral con-
straints. 6 4 In pursuing this account, Gauthier did not even resort to a
universalized rational account of morality, i.e., he did not shift the
focus from individual-level rationality to group-level rationality, argu-
ing that a third-person point of view required the individual to recog-
nize, on pain of contradiction, that accepting moral constraints was
best for everyone.65  Gauthier was unimpressed by such sleight-of-
hand.66 His vision of morality required that we face the hard ques-
tion: Is it rational for individuals, considering their self-interest, to ac-
cept the normative constraints of morality?6 7
60 DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS By AGREEMENT (1986).
61 Many moral philosophers have pursued similar themes, but without explicitly in-
voking game theory as a methodological tool. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF
ALTRUISM (1970); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998).
62 See generally JoHN RAWLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971) (describing and elaborating
upon the conception of justice that is implicit in the contract tradition).
63 GAUTHIER, supra note 60, at 9 ("Morality does not emerge as the rabbit from the
empty hat. .... [I]t emerges quite simply from the application of the maximizing concep-
tion of rationality to certain structures of interaction."); see also Jody S. Kraus & Jules L.
Coleman, Morality and the Theory of Rational Choice, in CoNTRACrARIANISM AND RATIONAL
CHOICE: ESSAYS ON DAVID GAUTHIER'S Morals By Agreement 254, 255 (Peter Vallentyne ed.,
1991) (arguing that rationality cannot provide the substantive content of morality).
64 GAUTHIER, supra note 60, at 9 ("Reason overrides the presumption against
morality.").
65 See id. at 10 (emphasizing that his theoretical focus is on why it is rational for indi-
viduals to agree to constraining principles ex ante as well as to comply with such agreed
constraints ex post).
66 This is one way of understanding Hobbes's theory: collective rationality and mutual
benefit demands a social contract, but individuals might prefer free riding, thus requiring
the Leviathan to enforce individual compliance. For further discussion of the relationship
of collective rationality to the social contract in Hobbes's theory, see PHILIP PETTIT, MADE
WITH WORDs: HOBBES ON LANGUAGE, MIND, AND PouTIcs (2008). See generally DAVID P.
GAUTHIER, THE LOGIC OF LEVIATHAN: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF THOMAS HoB-
Bs (1969) (describing, expanding, and critically reflecting upon Hobbes's moral and po-
litical theory).
67 For more recent projects pursuing the same line, see generally KEN BINMORE, GAME
THEORY AND THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcr 11: JUST PLAYING (1998) (using game theory to discuss
morality and social reform).
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A. Morality and the Prisoner's Dilemma
The answer-almost a revelation for Gauthier-lay in the Pris-
oner's Dilemma.68 Rational agents must make decisions based on the
expected moves of their competitors. Although the best possible out-
come for a given player is defection in the face of compliance by all
other competitors in the game, this outcome is also the outcome pre-
ferred by one's competitors. If all competitors defect, the resulting
payoff is extremely low, effectively throwing the game back into a state
of nature where no one complies with any moral constraints, thus pro-
ducing the worst possible outcome. The rational solution to the game
therefore requires acceptance of the objectively second-best (but, ra-
tionally, only possible) outcome: acceptance of reciprocal moral con-
straints on behavior.69 The purchase one gets from game theory is
that this acceptance is itself demanded by self-interested behavior. Ra-
tional agents seeking to maximize their own outcomes will choose
moral outcomes as long as morality is a group endeavor.
Of course, this still leaves unresolved the cleavage between the
rational agent at the social bargaining table-who is rationally com-
pelled to accept reciprocal moral constraints-and the rational agent
who must decide whether or not to comply with the social contract. It
is one thing to demonstrate the rationality of bargaining for moral
constraints and quite another to demonstrate the rationality of ex post
compliance with the results of the social contract. 70 For Gauthier,
such a rational agent must be considered a constrained maximizer, or
an agent who "enjoy[s] opportunities for co-operation which others
lack," as Gauthier puts it, as opposed to a straightforward maximizer.71
The question is whether the constrained maximizer receives coopera-
tive benefits that outweigh the risks associated with the strategy of con-
strained maximization-i.e., the risk that competitors in the game will
defect and reject compliance as their strategy.72
How can this be demonstrated? For Hobbes, the answer was sim-
ple: the sovereign itself ensures compliance, a fact that provided its
own rationale for Hobbes's specific rendering of The Leviathan.73
Once one steps outside the scope of a total sovereign, though, the
68 GAUTHIER, supra note 60, at v ("The present enquiry began. .. when, fumbling for
words in which to express the peculiar relationship between morality and advantage, I was
shown the Prisoner's Dilemma.").
69 Id. at 177 (arguing that cooperation and constraint by all would "yield nearly opti-
mal and fair outcomes").
70 Id. at 14-15.
71 Id. at 15.
72 Id. at 175-76.
73 See PETTIT, supra note 66, at 108 ("Hobbes's picture is that as [people] each con-
tract to create a commonwealth, people know that should they later defect, then the sover-
eign, drawing on the strength of the rest, will be there to punish them.").
883
HeinOnline  -- 96 Cornell L. Rev. 883 2010-2011
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
picture becomes more complicated. Various social institutions, both
informal and formal, exist to promote cooperation among con-
strained maximizers: increased trust between cooperators, reputa-
tional gains, and community structures only open to cooperators, all
of which have instrumental value for further cooperation. 7 4 Defec-
tors, though they achieve some benefits from their straightforward
maximization, lose all of the benefits of cooperation and suffer the
community penalties for defection.7 5 Consequently, constrained max-
imization is rational just so long as the community has the correct
ratio of constrained maximizers to straightforward maximizers. 76 In a
world filled with straightforward maximizers, the gains from (puta-
tive) cooperation would not outweigh the risks associated with the
compliance strategy. However, in a world with a significant propor-
tion of constrained maximizers, the strategy has a clear salience. Pre-
sumably, there is an empirical tipping point at which point the
strategy of constrained maximization becomes rational.7 7 The strat-
egy becomes a Nash Equilibrium.
One might argue that the concept of constrained maximization is
nothing more complicated than the concept of a long-term interest.
Agents are typically concerned with maximizing their gains in the pre-
sent and thus ignore strategies that will produce a maximum gain over
a longer time period. Whether one should maximize benefits now or
later depends on what discount rate the agent applies to future bene-
fits. If the discount rate is low (or zero), the agent will consider future
benefits at full value when engaging in decision making. If the dis-
count rate is high, the agent will discount the future benefits and treat
them as less valuable in deciding on a course of action today. Con-
strained maximizers certainly recognize that both the present and fu-
ture benefits of cooperation will far outweigh the constraints of their
behavior. But the strategy of constrained maximization is about far
more than simply long-term interests. The benefits of cooperation
may be far in the future or immediate; similarly, the demands of con-
straint may impose themselves today or tomorrow. The real distin-
74 The value of reputational gains and the costs associated with reputational losses will
depend on the degree to which reputation is carried over from one legal context to an-
other. See, e.g., GUZMAN, supra note 28, at 100-11 (discussing the compartmentalizing of
reputation); George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International
Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95 (2002) (outlining empirical and theoretical reasons for believ-
ing that the actual effects of reputation are both weaker and more complicated than the
standard view of reputation suggests); see also Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE
L.J. 559, 618 (2002) (noting that "states do not, in fact, interact solely with respect to one
rule or the other, and it is also possible to understand their interaction with respect both to
an individual rule and to the system of customary international law").
75 GAUTHIER, supra note 60, at 176-77.
76 Id. at 176.
77 See id. at 174-75.
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guishing factor of constrained maximization is a matter of pure
strategy: go it alone and reap the benefits and consequences of such
breach, or accept reciprocal constraints and receive the cooperative
benefits that go along with them.
B. Constrained Maximizers and International Law
One can see how the strategy of constrained maximization is di-
rectly applicable to international legal relations.78 When one state de-
cides on a strategy for diplomatic relations, it can choose to be a
straightforward maximizer or a constrained maximizer. However, de-
ciding to be a straightforward maximizer-although initially an attrac-
tive option-carries severe costs. A state that pursues this strategy will
be branded a rogue nation and deprive itself of the benefits associated
with cooperative constraints. Operating outside of the community of
nations carries enormous costs, as North Korea, Iran, and other isola-
tionist states can no doubt confirm.79 Those who adopt a strategy of
reciprocal commitments to international law live in not only a world
of relative security-fewer military interventions and aggressive acts-
but also a world of bilateral treaty arrangements that would otherwise
be unavailable to them. The rub of the argument is that the alleged
dichotomy between fidelity to international law and self-interested be-
havior turns out to be illusory.80 The fact that states are self-interested
in no way undermines the normativity of international law.
In the end, states cooperate by complying with international legal
norms and this commitment is necessarily grounded by their self-in-
terest. The new realists claim that acting out of self-interest under-
mines the normativity of the subsequent constraints, especially that of
customary norms built upon opiniojuris. However, if this is the lesson
that game theory teaches us for international law, then this must also
be the lesson that game theory provides for morality itself. If the Pris-
oner's Dilemma provides a reason to reject the normativity of interna-
tional law, then it must also provide a reason to reject the normativity
of morality. Consequently, the position of the new realists implies a
reductio ad absurdum to complete moral skepticism unless the new
78 Gauthier himself published work regarding Hobbes's theory of international rela-
tions. See, e.g., GAUTHIER, supra note 66, at 207-12 (discussing Hobbes's views on the state
of nations, and observing that the development of nuclear weapons is "bringing the state of
nations nearer to the true Hobbesian state of nature"); see also David Gauthier, Deterrence,
Maximization, and Rationality, in THE SECURITY GAMBLE: DETERRENCE DILEMMAS IN THE Nu-
CLEAR AGE 100, 107 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1984) (drawing on Hobbes's theories of nature
to defend the rationality of deterrent policies).
79 See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY. COM-
PLANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 70 (1995) (discussing South Af-
rica's status as an international pariah in the 1960s).
80 For a similar argument, see Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, 34
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 445, 447 (2006).
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realists can provide a salient asymmetry between international law and
morality itself.
In searching for this alleged asymmetry, the new realists fre-
quently resort to their old bailiwick: the lack of international enforce-
ment mechanisms to punish defectors or straightforward
maximizers. 8 While it is no doubt true that international enforce-
ment mechanisms are feeble when compared to their domestic ana-
logues, the fact is often repeated to the point of exaggeration.82 It is
certainly not the case that there are no viable mechanisms of enforce-
ment; this point has already been exhaustively detailed in the litera-
ture and I shall not rehash the evidence here.83 Further, even if we
accept the proposition that international compliance mechanisms are
comparably feeble, the rest of the argument does not follow. The rel-
ative lack of enforcement mechanisms might be a relevant asymmetry
between international law and domestic law, but it is hardly a relevant
asymmetry between international law and morality. Indeed, moral
norms-especially those that do not find their expression codified in
the criminal law-rely on exactly the same kind of inchoate and alleg-
edly nebulous mechanisms that punish defectors and provide most
individuals with a rational reason to choose constrained maximization
as their strategy. If this were not the case, then most individuals would
reject as illusory all moral norms entirely. Both morality and interna-
tional law create robust systems that reward cooperative behavior.
Why do the new realists resist these arguments? Although the
concept of constrained maximization is nowhere considered in The
Limits of International Law, some clues are offered in Eric Posner's
work on social norms.84 In Law and Social Norms, Posner concedes
that rational agents will engage in "principled" behavior and will reap
the reputational rewards associated with using the rhetoric of princi-
ple. 85 The language of principle has a signaling effect to potential
associates: this agent can be trusted because he will never betray you. 86
81 Cf GLENNON, supra note 44, at 60-64 (discussing desuetude).
82 See also CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 47-49
(1979) (noting that, in the face of considerable empirical evidence to the contrary, people
continue to suggest that international relations resembles a Hobbesian state of nature).
83 See, e.g., CHAYEs & CHAYEs, supra note 79, at 22-28 (proposing different methods of
ensuring compliance); see also DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ, THE SANCTIONs DEC-
ADE: ASSESSING UN STRATEGIES IN THE 1990s (2000) (analyzing the effectiveness of twelve
cases of UN sanctions).
84 See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NoRMs (2000).
85 Id. at 187 (asserting that people rationally use the rhetoric of principle "in order to
obtain strategic advantages in their interactions with others").
86 Posner cashes out the idea of an absolute principle as a claim regarding incom-
mensurability. See id. at 192-98. In other words, if someone says that no amount of money
will convince them to give up a much-needed vacation with his or her family, that person is
implicitly saying that the value of money and the value of time with his or her family are
incommensurable and cannot be compared. If they could be compared, according to Pos-
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But under Posner's view of rational choice, such a blind commitment
to principle is either illusory or insincere.87 At some point, the costs
of adhering to the demands of principle will become too high, and
any rational agent (according to Posner) will defect and violate the
demands of principle.88 But saying: "I will follow principle but only if
the costs aren't too high" will not help one attract collaborators who
are rightly scared away by such conditional language.89 Thus, the re-
sult is that people cling to the rhetoric of absolute commitment to
principle, and when self-interest demands defection from the princi-
ple, "they cheat and try to conceal their opportunism behind casu-
istry."90 The unprincipled attempt to have their cake and eat it too by
attempting to blend in among a crowd of principled agents.91 This
strategy works because it is very difficult for the public to distinguish
between the principled and the unprincipled.92
The same view apparently underlies Posner's attitude about na-
tional compliance with international legal norms. 93 States will adopt
the language of principled adherence to international law, but when
self-interest demands defection, they can-and should-act out of
self-interest. 94 Such a state may very well attempt to conceal its behav-
ior and develop obfuscations in an attempt to explain away the defec-
tion.95 The state will attempt to defect and still reap the rewards of
constrained maximization.96
The question is whether a state can successfully adopt the insin-
cere rhetoric of constrained maximization (i.e., fidelity to interna-
tional law) while at the same time defecting and ignoring
international legal norms. But in this respect, there is a relevant asym-
metry between individuals and nations. While the individual can hide
his decision-making process from potential collaborators, most mod-
ern nation-states conduct their decision making through various inter-
nal actors. These debates are often-though not always-public or
semipublic. Disputes with domestic constituencies are laid bare for
ner, there would be a price at which the amount of money would outweigh the value of the
time with the family. Id. at 193-94. Posner concludes that incommensurability claims sig-
nal to others that one will not cheat. Id. at 197.
87 Id. at 195-97.
88 Id. at 190 (asserting, as an example, that "a rational person will sacrifice his reputa-
tion when the gains are sufficiently high").
89 Id. at 197.
90 Id. at 195.
91 Id. at 197-98.
92 Id. at 197.
93 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 167-84 (discussing their "theory of
international rhetoric").
94 Id. at 185.
95 Id. at 169 ("[Sitates provide legal or moral justifications for their actions, no matter
how transparently self-interested their actions are.").
96 Id. at 172.
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the entire world to see.9 7 If a domestic constituency presses the gov-
ernment to ignore international law out of self-interest, this plea will
be heard not just by its own government but by the world. The ability
to act insincerely is comparatively more difficult in the case of nation-
states than it is with individuals. To the extent that some states, such
as North Korea, conduct deliberations in secret, these states appear to
be the least likely to insincerely claim adherence to international legal
norms. Such rogue nations are often the least likely to publicly tout
their adherence to, and participation in, international legal and regu-
latory regimes.
C. Compliance and the Rationality of Plans
However, this still leaves a theoretical tension between the de-
mands of rationality (occasional defection) and the demands of mo-
rality that counsels adherence to principle even in the face of rational
opportunism. For Goldsmith and Posner, there is no moral basis to
tell a state to follow international law when rational self-interest coun-
sels in favor of defection.98 And if indeed there arises a situation
where the gains of defection outweigh the loss of cooperative opportu-
nities at any given moment, rational choice would appear to demand
defection. And since our account of morality is closely linked with
rational choice, there would appear to be no basis to tell a nation to
forego self-interest in favor of principle.
Gauthier's initial answer to this conundrum was to frame his ac-
count in terms of dispositions to cooperate-dispositions that were
themselves rational (and moral) insofar as one found oneself in a
community with a sufficient number of agents who were similarly dis-
posed.99 In later work, Gauthier pushed beyond the concept of dispo-
sitions to cooperate in favor of an account of agency that linked
intentions with plans and strategies that operate over time.' 00 In
other words, although rational choice theory-including Posner's ver-
sion-considers an agent's all-things-considered judgment at each car-
dinal point in time, rational human agency operates in a far more
subtle way. Were rational agents to recalculate rational choice at
every cardinal time point, they would be exhausted and weighed down
97 Cf. id. at 178-79 (discussing how leaders will address their speech to foreign leaders
but intend their talk for domestic audiences).
98 Id. at 185.
99 See GAUTHIER, supra note 60, at 182-84.
100 See, e.g., David Gauthier, Commitment and Choice: An Essay on the Rationality of Plans,
in ETHIIcs, RATIONALITY, AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 217, 217-19 (Francesco Farina et al.
eds., 1996) [hereinafter Gauthier, Commitment and Choice] (arguing that plans serve as a
rational guide for subsequent actions); see also David Gauthier, Intention and Deliberation, in
MODELING RATIONALITY, MORALITY, AND EVOLUTION 41, 53 (Peter A. Danielson ed., 1998)
(discussing why an agent would rationally deliberate about plans).
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by the process of deliberation to the point of total collapse 101-liter-
ally, paralysis by analysis.
Instead, rational agency should be understood in terms of strate-
gies selected after moments of deliberation, after which the chosen
strategies only come up for reevaluation at certain moments in
time.102 What is missing from Posner's account, in other words, is the
concept of plans.03 And plans are sticky in the sense that rational
agents form an intention to follow a plan and do not give up the plan
at the drop of a hat.104 Living life as a rational agent requires the use
of plans; rational agency would be unimaginable without them. 05
One might object that the stickiness of plans is irrational.106 In
other words, a truly rational agent should be constantly reevaluating
the rational benefits associated with their plan and all alternate
plans. 10 7 The rational agent should be playing chess like Deep Blue
(reevaluating the benefits of every possible move at each move) and
not like Garry Kasparov (pursuing and committing to a long-term
strategy to win the game). To the extent that human agents are inca-
pable of calculating like Deep Blue, perhaps one should count this
limitation as a failure of rationality.
Gauthier, drawing partially on the work of Bratman and others,
points out that the answer is not so simple. 08 Even if defection at any
given moment is rationally beneficial, this is not the right comparison.
Pursuing the strategy of rational choice at each cardinal time point
may turn out to be less effective than choosing an overall strategy or
plan that is rationally justified and then sticking to it.109 Indeed, con-
101 See Gauthier, Commitment and Choice, supra note 100, at 219 (discussing how agents
who adopt a plan restrict subsequent deliberation for actions that are compatible with that
plan).
102 Id. at 219-21 (describing conditions for rational reconsideration).
103 See generally MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON (1987)
(providing a more elaborate discussion on the role of plans in understanding the relation-
ship between rationality and action).
104 Id. at 64-65 (discussing plan stability in order to explain the rationality of an
agent's reconsideration or non-reconsideration of a plan); see also Gauthier, Commitment
and Choice, supra note 100, at 221 ("[A] full appreciation of the role that plans play in
deliberation requires revisions in the orthodox view of economic rationality.").
105 BRATMAN, supra note 103, at 2-3.
106 Compare Gauthier, Commitment and Choice, supra note 100, at 221-22 ("[F]rom the
standpoint of the economist ... [a]n agent's reasons for an action are adequate just in case
he prefers the expected outcome of that action no less than the expected outcome of any
of its alternatives. The expected outcome of an action is the probability-weighted sum of
the possible outcomes of the action."), with GAUTHIER, supra note 60, at 184-85.
107 Gauthier, Commitment and Choice, supra note 100, at 222.
108 See id. at 222-23 (discussing how the thesis that human beings are maximizing indi-
viduals can be applied to rational planning). For further discussion, see generally EDWARD
F. MCCLENNEN, RATIONALITY AND DYNAMIC CHOICE: FOUNDATIONAL EXPLORATIONS (1990)
(analyzing how to normatively justify principles of rationality).
109 Gauthier, Commitment and Choice, supra note 100, at 228 (challenging the view that
"directly maximizing considerations are to be brought to bear on each particular choice").
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sistently pursuing rational choice at each time point may end up be-
ing self-defeating in the long run.110 Plans provide stability for agents
to pursue long-term interests and should only be abandoned in favor
of new plans, not in favor of momentary and isolated desires.' An
agent that is too easily lured from a stable plan by opportunistic defec-
tion is a myopic chooser. 1 2 Another way of stating the point is that the
rationality of compliance with the reciprocal constraint-following
the rules and resisting the temptation to defect-is conditional on the
constraint's place within the larger, rationally justified plan.113
The structure of this argument is well known to moral theorists
who debate the relative merits of act utilitarianism and rule utilitarian-
ism. 1 14 Act utilitarians evaluate the consequences of each individual
act and identify the moral thing to do based on this calculation.115 By
contrast, rule utilitarians evaluate general moral rules based on their
guidelines and then identify certain rules as amoral regardless of their
consequences at any individual decisional time point.116 One reason
for supporting rule utilitarianism is that, in the end, it may produce
superior consequences globally, as compliance is better achieved in a
world with sticky moral norms rather than constantly shifting moral
evaluations. Ironically, constant reevaluation of the consequences at
each moment in time may end up being self-defeating.
None of this is new in the moral or political theory literature.
Within the recent debate in the international law literature, the basic
assumptions regarding rational choice among the new realists have
gone relatively unchallenged. Some have questioned the wisdom of
Simply put, commitment to a plan "makes planning maximally efficacious in co-ordinating
one's own actions .. . with those of others, so that one may best realize one's objectives."
Id.
110 See id. at 242-43.
111 See Michael E. Bratman, Following Through with One's Plans: Reply to David Gauthier, in
MODELING RATIONALTrY, MORALITY, AND EVOLUTION, supra note 100, at 55 (arguing that
rational deliberation and plan stability are linked by the concept of planning). Along with
Gauthier, Bratman believes that deliberation about future actions "is justified by appeal to
its expected long-run impacts." See id. at 59. Bratman concludes that reconsideration of a
plan is rationally justified if the agent believes that a specific alternative will better achieve
"the very same long-standing, stable and coherent desires and values." Id. at 61; see also
Michael E. Bratman, Planning and Temptation, in MIND AND MoRALs: ESsAYS ON COGNITIVE
SCIENCE AND ETHics 293, 294 (Larry May et al. eds., 1996) (suggesting that coordination is
impossible without stable intentions and plans).
112 For a discussion of myopic choosers, see Edward F. McClennen, Rationality and
Rules, in MODELING RATIONALITY, MORALITY, AND EVOLUTION, supra note 100, at 16. A for-
mal model was first offered by R.H. Strotz in Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility
Maximization, 23 REv. ECON. STUD. 165, 173 (1955).
113 Claire Finkelstein developed a version of this view in her essay, Acting on an Inten-
tion, in REASONS AND INTENTIONs 67, 83 (Bruno Verbeek ed., 2008).
114 See, e.g., J.J.C. Smart, Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism, in ETHICAL THEORY 286,
286-88 (James Rachels ed., 1998).
115 Id. at 286-87.
116 Id. at 287.
890 [Vol. 96:869
HeinOnline  -- 96 Cornell L. Rev. 890 2010-2011
2011] NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
applying rational choice to international law; others have accepted the
methodology but simply claimed that it yields different results.'17 But
what is badly needed is critical reevaluation of the version of rational
choice theory used by the new realists.118
There is strong reason to believe that states are rationally justified
in pursuing a strategy of constrained maximization and sticking to it
even when faced with the temptation of opportunistic defection.
Even if states could masquerade as principled-a doubtful proposi-
tion-constant defection from international legal norms may produce
negative outcomes over time. It might be more rational for states to
pick the strategy that is rationally justified and stick to it: either try
one's best to engage with international institutions or ignore them.
Although it is unclear if this thesis could be empirically tested, it is
very suggestive that the most successful nations in the world partici-
pate in international legal institutions whereas rogue nations on the
periphery often are beset with hunger, famine, and war.
III
OBJECTIONS TO THE MORAL OBLIGATION OF STATES
At this point, several other objections to my account must be con-
sidered. The most worrisome objection, addressed in Part III.A, is
that Gauthier's theory of morality, and our extrapolation of that the-
ory to the domain of international law, has fallen victim to the natural-
istic fallacy. A second objection outlined in Part III.B concerns the
unequal bargaining strength of states-one alleged reason for
stronger states to refrain from a strategy of constrained maximization.
The third objection, addressed in Part III.C, is that states are collective
entities that are unable to bear a moral obligation and that only indi-
viduals are directly subject to the demands of morality. If this view is
correct, it would be nonsensical to say that a state has a moral duty to
follow international law.
A. Rationality: Normative, Not Descriptive
If the entire project is designed to derive morality from reason,
then it would indeed appear as if we have attempted to jump over the
is-ought gap. In his later work, Rawls famously distanced himself
from any attempt to derive morality from reason, 19 though in his earli-
est work he described his social contract theory as one piece of a gen-
117 See, e.g., GuZMAN, supra note 28, at 15-22.
118 Cf GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 7-10 (addressing the methodology of
rational choice theory, but mostly addressing constructivist challenges).
119 See JOHN RAWLS, PoLITICAL LIBERALISM 52 (expanded ed. 1996) ("Justice as fair-
ness .... does not try to derive the reasonable from the rational.").
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eral theory of rational choice, similar to John Harsanyi.120 Indeed,
the whole project of deriving morality from reason stems from Kant
and his obsession with practical reason and finds its apex in contem-
porary moral philosophers such as Rawls and Alan Gewirth. 121 In his
later work, Rawls took great pains to emphasize the role of reflective
equilibrium in his methodology: not a top-down derivation but rather
a theoretical device for navigating toward a coherent vision of justice
as fairness both in the original position and in defensible principles of
justice.122
Have we fallen victim to the naturalistic fallacy here? The answer
requires an important clarification. In deriving morality from ration-
ality, we are not deriving morality from the fact of rationality. Rather,
we are deriving moral value from rationality as a value.123 Simply put,
constrained maximizers ought to pursue compliance as their strategy
if they are committed to rationality as a value. If they aspire to be
rational, then this is what rationality demands, though there is noth-
ing that requires them to be rational. Moral value turns out to be some-
what parasitic on normative rationality-precisely the lesson that
game theory has taught both moral philosophers and international
lawyers.
Are individuals committed to rationality as a norm? They cer-
tainly are, and undeniably so, insofar as they hope to exercise rational
agency. 124 Indeed, even the most elementary forms of agency require
a commitment to rationality in the form of means-end reasoning, the
transitive ordering of preferences, and the law of noncontradiction. It
is very difficult-perhaps impossible-to imagine interhuman rela-
tions, including language, without this commitment to basic princi-
ples of rationality. And the fact that individuals may be imperfectly
rational is entirely irrelevant to the point here. One's normative com-
mitments may fall well short of perfection, or even large-scale success,
120 Compare RAWLs, supra note 62, at 16 (noting that contract terminology conveys the
idea that principles of justice are principles that would be chosen by rational persons and
that "[t]he theory of justice is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of
rational choice"), with John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behaviour, in
UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 39, 39 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (noting
that his ethical theory, while based on intellectual traditions in moral philosophy, makes
essential use of the modern Bayesian theory of rational behavior).
121 See, e.g., ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978).
122 SeeJoHN RAWLS, JusTiCE As FAIRNEss: A RESTATEMENT 29 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
123 For a discussion of the structure of the naturalistic problem regarding rationality,
see Ronald de Sousa, Modeling Rationality: A Normative or Descriptive Task?, in MODELING
RATIONALITY, MORALITY, AND EVOLUTION, supra note 100, at 120 (defining normativism as
the claim that "within all attempts to model actual reasoning processes there must be an
ineliminable element of normativity").
124 See Christine M. Korsgaard, Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Re-
sponse to Parfit, 18 PHIL. & Pus. Ave. 101, 109-15 (1989) (discussing how rational, unified
agents make life plans).
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but that is not evidence that one is not committed to the value in
question. No one achieves perfect rationality just as no one achieves
perfect morality. But this is trivial; the point is that if individuals are
committed to rationality, then they ought to be committed to a strat-
egy of constrained maximizing in the form of accepting reciprocal
moral constraints. And, as it happens, all individuals are committed
to rationality as a norm because this value commitment is constitutive
of rational agency itself. Committing to rationality is part of what it
means to be a rational agent.125
Can the same thing be said about states? Are they committed to
rationality as a value? The question is best pursued from the opposite
direction: how could we deny that states are committed to rationality
as a norm? States have interests and pursue collective projects on the
international stage in order to maximize those interests.126 Those
projects involve rationality over time and necessarily require basic
principles of rationality such as the transitive ordering of preferences
and fidelity to the principle of noncontradiction.127 The only relevant
difference between states and individuals is the lack of phenomeno-
logical unity among the former.128 While each individual typically en-
joys a unified phenomenological point of view, states are composed of
many individuals, each of whom represents their own unified phe-
nomenological point of view.129 But the lack of phenomenological
unity of the state does not prevent it from exercising rational agency.
Although the phenomenological unity of the individual certainly facil-
itates rational integration (viz., self-knowledge and direct epistemic ac-
cess to one's own thoughts), none of this implies that there cannot
exist external means of displaying a shared commitment to rationality.
This is precisely what a state achieves through government, a system of
representation and deliberation, and diplomatic representation on
the world stage.130 To deny the rational agency of states would be to
deny the foundations of international relations.
125 See ISAAc LEVI, THE COVENANT OF REASON: RATIONALITY AND THE COMMITMENTS OF
THOUGHT 1-19 (1997).
126 This view is arguably implicit in JOHN RAwts, THE LAw OF PEOPLES: WITH "THE IDEA
OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED" 32 (2001). See also HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 154 (1952) (discussing the relationship of a state to the international
community).
127 See also Philip Pettit, Collective Persons and Powers, 8 LEGAL THEORY 443 (2002) (dis-
cussing the organization of certain collectives).
128 For more on the irrelevancy of this distinction for purposes of the commitment to
rationality, see CAROL ROVANE, THE BOUNDS OF AGENCY AN ESSAY IN REVISIONARY METAPHYS-
Ics 132 (1998).
129 Cf Carol Rovane, What Is an Agent?, 140 SYNTHESE 181 (2004) (discussing group
agents).
130 See ISAAC LEVI, HARD CHOICES: DECISION MAKNG UNDER UNRESOLVED CONFucr 151
(1986) ("[E]ven students of market economies attribute beliefs, desires, goals, values and
choices to families, firms and, of course, government agencies . . . .").
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B. Bargaining Power
We must now redeem a promissory note and account for the fact
that states bargaining for international legal norms do not stand in a
position of equal bargaining strength.131 Up until this point, we have
assumed that participants in the Prisoner's Dilemma are bare self-in-
terested agents, without further consideration of their particular
strengths and weaknesses that might affect their ability or willingness
to defect. 1 3 2 Indeed, the new realists make much of the unequal bar-
gaining power of states and conclude that stronger states will ignore
international law simply because they can.' 33 Given that the unequal
bargaining power of states is undeniable (even though it stands in ten-
sion with the formal equality of all states under international law), it
would seem that our account is impoverished at best and irrelevant at
worst.134
This anxiety is misplaced. The unequal bargaining power of
states is relevant under our model because it affects the costs of non-
compliance and the benefits associated with cooperation. As to the
former, stronger states will face less retaliation for their noncompli-
ance because weaker states might feel that they need to sign agree-
ments with the stronger state even if previous defections alert the
weaker state to the risk that the strong state will again defect. The
unequal bargaining power might bring the weaker state to the table in
spite of this prediction. Second, the benefits associated with coopera-
tion are less significant for stronger states. Their stronger status might
open up avenues of cooperation simply because they are stronger and
because other states therefore need their cooperation-cooperation
that is entirely independent of their strategy of constrained
maximization.135
Three points are in order here. First, the difference in bargain-
ing power will be most salient when strong and weak states bargain
against each other, but will be irrelevant when strong states bargain
against each other and weak states do likewise. Second, the difference
in bargaining power does not prevent strong and weak states from
signing agreements; it simply increases the likelihood that the
stronger state might be tempted to defect. In cases where the
stronger state is strong enough to eschew constrained maximization
entirely in favor a strategy of straightforward maximization, the state
131 See generally Franck, supra note 26 (discussing international law in an age of dispari-
ties of power).
132 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
133 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 116 (discussing how weaker states
can be coerced into compliance by more powerful states).
134 For a discussion of this problem, see BErrZ, supra note 82, at 41-44, 47-48.
135 For a general discussion of how underlying geopolitical realities can preclude es-
tablishing effective rules of international law, see GLENNON, supra note 44.
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may indeed defect. This is most likely in contexts where international
law has weak enforcement mechanisms. In contexts where the en-
forcement mechanisms-however diffuse and informal-are working
properly, constrained maximization will continue to be viable even for
strong states.
Third and most importantly, the fact that some states will defect
in favor of straightforward maximization in some contexts is com-
pletely irrelevant for situations where constrained maximization con-
tinues to be most valuable. Indeed, this is the logical error made by
the new realists. They point out the situations where unequal bargain-
ing power and lack of enforcement allows stronger states to ignore
international law with impunity, i.e., to act in their own self-interest.13 6
In such cases, it is indeed correct to suggest that international law is
ineffective. But the new realists then use this fact as a pivot to say
something about situations when international law is effective, i.e.,
when states agree to follow international law because the value of con-
strained maximization is high. Since this latter situation is also gov-
erned by self-interest, the new realists implicitly conclude that even
these domains of international cooperation have little or no norma-
tive pull because there is no sense of legal obligation.137 This is an
error. One should see immediately that the underlying current of
self-interest works differently in each case. In the latter, self-interest
entails constrained maximization and fidelity to international norms;
in the former, self-interest entails defection. The fact that some states
will violate international law when reason counsels defection does not
mean that they are not following international law when reason de-
mands respect for it.
It should come as no surprise both that there are areas where
international law remains ineffective due to insufficient enforcement
mechanisms and that the absence of enforcement is less of a con-
straint for the most powerful nations. Though this is a pedestrian
point, it does point toward one aspect of the new realist critique that
demands further study: the degree to which power imbalances change
the tipping point at which a state has reason to shift from straightfor-
ward maximization to constrained maximization. This question is
136 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 66-75 (discussing patterns of state
compliance-and lack thereof-with regards to the customary international law exempt-
ing fishing vessels from right of capture during times of war); id. at 116-17 (discussing
strategic coercion, "often in violation of international law" by stronger states to make
weaker states comply with human rights norms when such compliance is in the interest of
the stronger states).
137 Id. at 90 ("[W]e have explained the logic of treaties without reference to notions of
'legality' or pacta sunt servanda or related concepts. As was the case with customary interna-
tional law, the cooperation and coordination models explain the behaviors associated with
treaties without reliance on these factors, or on what international lawyers sometimes call
'normative pull.'").
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largely empirical and ought to be studied more systematically by schol-
ars with training in empirical legal studies. However, the goal of such
research would not be to undermine the normativity of international
law, but rather to determine with empirical rigor those areas where
international law is least effective and where systems of enforcement
ought to be strengthened. 13 8
C. The Moral Obligation of Groups
This Essay now concludes by briefly rejecting another alleged rea-
son why states need not follow international law: the supposed inabil-
ity of collective entities to bear moral or legal responsibilities.
According to the new realists, corporate bodies (including states) are
incapable of bearing such obligations.139 Although corporations en-
joy legal rights and bear legal responsibilities, they do so because their
constituent parts-officers, directors, employees, and shareholders-
all benefit from, and consent to, corporate obligations. 140 Sharehold-
ers accept the risk of paying for corporate obligations (including un-
foreseen liabilities) because they also accept the promise of future
dividends based on their equity stake.141 Although states do not
demonstrate the same kind of internal organization, they nonetheless
do organize themselves so that they can act on the world stage, form
alliances and agreements with other states, and enjoy all of the coop-
erative benefits of constrained maximizers. Although the citizen does
not receive dividends like a shareholder, the citizen certainly enjoys
the cooperative benefits of living in a state that engages in interna-
tional relations: everything from economic opportunities fueled by
trade to the peace dividends that flow from the prohibition on the
international use of force. Citizens do not consent in the same way as
do shareholders who purchase stock, but their acceptance of the ben-
efits of citizenship certainly functions as tacit consent. 1 4 2
i s See, e.g., Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51
Bura. L. REv. 679, 681 (2003) ("Despite the significant advancements made in the study of
international cooperation, there remains a gap between the types of institutions that tradi-
tional game theory predicts should exist and the types of institutions found in reality.");
Ryan Goodman & DerekJinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EuR.J. INT'L
L. 171 (2003) (analyzing a study that aims to quantify the effect of human rights treaty
ratification on human rights violations); Michael P. Scharf, International Law in Crisis: A
Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the Compliance Debate, 31 CARDOzo L. REv. 45 (2009)
(using qualitiative empirical data to assess the influence of international law on the forma-
tion of U.S. foreign policy in times of crisis).
139 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 186.
140 Id. at 187-88.
141 Id. at 188 (citing CHRISTOPHER KuTz, COMPuCTIv ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLEC-
TIVE AGE 253 (2000)).
142 See 2 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 119-22, at 347-49 (Peter
L.aslett ed., rev. ed. 1988) (1690).
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The new realists also claim that states cannot be morally bound
by international law because they are incapable of consenting to their
obligations, a fundamental precondition of international treaties and
customary law.143 Under this view, corporations have the power to
make binding commitments only because doing so increases the au-
tonomy of its individual members: thus, the corporate power to con-
sent to obligations only has instrumental value.'" When the
corporate commitment is too burdensome to the individuals, they de-
mand the corporation change the commitment, whereas citizens of a
state allegedly have no such authority. Once a state accepts a legal
obligation, it remains operative for future generations even after the
original citizens are dead.14 5 Although international legal obligations
are surely dynamic in nature as states abrogate, amend, supplement,
and revoke treaties constantly, the persistent objector doctrine and jus
cogens may limit a state's opportunities for revising customary interna-
tional law.146
Furthermore, the new realists reject the possibility that the auton-
omy of states has intrinsic value.147 The warrant for this conclusion is
that states, unlike individuals, have no life plans, and therefore are not
valid subjects of the principles of autonomy that are required for an
agent to realize a life plan.'48 This conclusion bears scrutiny.149 If a
state lacks the agency necessary to realize a life plan, it is unclear how
a state has enough agency to exercise supposedly self-interested be-
havior on the world stage. Implicit in the notion of self-interested
behavior, consistent with the Prisoner's Dilemma, is the notion of a
rational agent with enough foresight to have long-term interests
(through subsequent iterations of the game). If the possibility of a
state's life plan is rejected, then so is the entire applicability of the
game theory methodology to international law and international rela-
tions; one would effectively have to throw out the baby with the
bathwater. A state's normative agency inevitably entails the construc-
143 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 8, at 189.
144 See id. at 187-88.
145 See id. at 190-91.
146 See id. at 189.
147 Id. at 191.
148 Id.
149 The conclusion that the autonomy of states (and nations) has no intrinsic value
can and should be resisted, though a full account is impossible here. See, e.g., CHARLES
TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989) (presenting a
history of the modem identity); see also WILL KYMLICKA, STATES, NATIONS AND CULTURES
(1997) (arguing that group rights are derived from enlightenment commitment to individ-
ual flourishing); Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 305, 320 (2006) (discussing how those who embrace a cosmopolitan
moral perspective should regard international law); Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, Na-
tional Self-Determination, 87 J. PHIL. 439, 443 (1990) (discussing the moral justifications for
national self-determination).
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tion of long-term interests, which renders the state capable of con-
senting to (and bearing) legal obligations.
One might respond that there is a difference between a state's
capacity for agency and whether this autonomy is intrinsically valua-
ble. On this view, states are capable of exercising collective agency,
though this agency only has instrumental value insofar as it facilitates
or maximizes the autonomy of individual citizens whose life plans may
require organization into collective units (states) that can operate on
the world stage. Something along these lines might be implicit in
Kymlicka's account of individual human flourishing within a commu-
nity.o50 That is, the life plan of the state has no independent intrinsic
value.
I reject this view of the collective entity as having no independent
moral value, though I cannot defend fully the claim in this limited
forum.15' Nations, both in the cultural abstract and in their particular
organization as nation-states, contribute to the rich tapestry of human
existence.' 52 However, merely assuming arguendo that states have no
independent autonomy does not by itself require the conclusion that
states are incapable of bearing moral obligations. There is a missing
proposition in the argument, namely that moral obligations at the col-
lective level evaporate if they fail to maximize the autonomy of
individuals.
This need not be the case. One might coherently argue that
once properly formed from the material of rational individuals, states
become distinct entities whose interrelations are governed by an au-
tonomous sphere of legal relations that are independent of the do-
mestic laws governing their citizens internally. Just as one might call a
corporation a legal or metaphysical fiction (though I do not subscribe
to this view),153 one might just as well dismiss a state with the same
epithet. But the fiction might be sufficiently robust that its own collec-
tive agency generates corresponding moral duties even if, at the end
of the day, its moral significance originally emerged from its constitu-
ent parts. A state without citizens would not have any value; however,
once a state is composed of individuals and begins to exercise collec-
tive rationality in its engagement with other states, it becomes capable
of bearing moral obligations. Indeed, I have tried to demonstrate in
this Essay that a state's collective rationality (in the form of con-
150 See KYMLICKA, supra note 149, at 35.
151 For a full defense of the value of collectivities, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS
DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HuMANIY- WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (2008).
152 See id. at 136-47.
153 See FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS, BAND 2,
236 (1840) (asserting that juridical persons are fictitious but are nevertheless entitled to
rights by extension).
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strained maximization) requires that it follow international legal
obligation.
CONCLUSION
Although the new realists offer an academic argument, it is im-
portant to remember that their game-theory-fuelled skepticism codi-
fies a view that extends far beyond the academy-it pervaded
American foreign policy for much of the last decade. 154 Although
many commentators have exposed the flaws in such reasoning, few of
the criticisms have-as we have done here-explicitly focused on the
link between national self-interest and fidelity to legal norms as being
essentially the same dynamic underlying normative rationality and
normative morality. This is an ambitious claim; those who reject this
account of morality might also reject its relevance for a theory of inter-
national law. For some, the notion of constrained maximization may
leave little room for our folk concept of altruism or for doing what's
right when it requires significant sacrifice. But this account of moral-
ity leaves open the possibility that in any one scenario, fidelity to
norms may require significant sacrifice; the account simply insists that,
as an overall and long-term strategy, constrained maximization is ra-
tionally justified. For the very same reason, states might still comply
with international law with opinio juris-a sense of obligation-know-
ing that in any one context it might involve a sacrifice but with full
knowledge that in the long term, constrained maximization is in the
nation's self-interest. In a way, this is the lesson that was lost in our
foreign policy over the last decade.
154 Cf JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY" LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2007) (discussing the author's experiences as head of the Office of Legal
Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice from 2003 to 2004).
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